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[L. A. No. 29441.

In Bank.

Apr. 15, 1968.]

GAIL ELKIND, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SYLVAN
BYCK, JR., Defendant and Respondent.
[la, Ib] Parent and Child-Support-Uniform Act-Effect of
Lump Sum Settlement.-A mother awarded custody of her
minor child in a Georgia divorce and now resident in New
York was entitled under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 1670 et seq) to apply to
the California courts for fair and reasonable child support
from the father, where, although the Georgia decree had incorporated a once-for-all lump-sum settlement for child support, as permitted in Georgia, Georgia's uniform act ,at that
time provided that the duties of support were those of the
state where the obligor was present during the perIod for
which support was sought, and where, although the father's
present domicile was not indicated by the record, he had apparently left Georgia for good and made California his home
and place of business.
[2] Id.-Support-Contracts Affecting Child's Right to Support.
-Civ. Code, § 139, relating to child support, and Civ. Code,
§ 138, relating to child custody but also construed to govern
[1] Reciprocal enforcement of duty to support dependents, construction and application of state statutes providing for, note,
42 A.L.R.2d 768. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Parent and Child, §§ 76, 77;
Am.Jur., Parent and Child (1st ed §§ 35.1, 45).
McK. Dig. References: [1) Parent and Child, § 29.5; [2] Parent
and C-\lild, § 23; [3] Judgments, § 474(1}; Conflict of Laws, § 1 i
[4]4ppeal
and Error, § 27.
.
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orders for child support, preclude the rights of minor children
to proper support from being abridged by any agreement between their parents.
[3] Judgments-Sister States-Full Faith and Oredit-Purpose.
-The purpose of the full faith and credit cla~e of the U.S.
Constitution is to establish throughout the federal system the
salutary principle of the common law that a litigation once
pursued to judgment shall be as conclusive of the rights of
the parties in every other court as in that where the judgment was rendered.
[4] Appeal-Decisions Appealable-Order Denying Relief Under
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.-The right
to appeal from an order of a California court denying relief
under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1670 et seq) being governed by California
law, the order is appealnble as a final judgment entered in a
special proceeding in the superior court (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 963 sub.d.l).

APPEAL from a judgment (order denying relief) of the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County denying a petition for
support for a minor child. H. Elliott Pownall, Court Commissioner, Judge pro tem. Reversed.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Edward M. Belasco
and William L. Zessar, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Schuman, Novak & Cooper and Mark S. Novak for Defendant and Respondent.
TRA YNOR, C. J.-Plaintiff appeals from an order denying
her application for child support filed under the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (hereafter URESA;
Code Civ. Proc., § 1670 etseq.).
Plaintiff and defendant were married in New York on May
4, 1956, and divorced in Georgia on July 31, 1957. Their
daugllter, Kim Ivy, was born on April 19, 1957. "In lieu of
permanent alimony," the judgment of divorce" incorporated
in its entirety" the agreement made between the parties on
July 3, 1957, "with reference to the support and maintenance" of the plaintiff and her minor child.
The agreement recited the parties' wish to have a "complete and final scttlement" of their rights and obligations.
Plaintiff received eustody of the child. Defendant agreed to
deposit with It desigullted Georgia bunk, as trustee, the sum of
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$11,500 to form the corpus of a trust for the support of the
child until she reached the age of 18 years, "in lieu of any
claim which said child or the legal representative of said child
now has or may hereafter be entitled to from her father or his
estate for past, present and future support and maintenance,
alimony or a year's support." The profits of the trust were
to be applied by the trustee for the payment of $60 per month
for the support of the child, and the corpus could be in\'aded
under certain circumstances. In addition, defendant agreed to
establish a trust of $2,500 for the sole purpose of providing a
college education for the child. The parties agreed that "No
changes in the financial condition or circumstances of the
parties or of said minor shall authorize either of said parties
and/or court to change or modify the terms or provisions of
said flgreement or any judgment or decree that might be rendered in any regard to any of' the matters set out in said
agreement; the parties to this agreement having taken into
consideration said changes of conditions or circumstances and
also the possibility that an act or statute might be passed in
the future authorizing the modification of any judgment or
decree with reference to alimony. Said parties waive and
renounce any rights which might accrue to them by virtue of
any change or condition, or by virtue of any statute or law
being passed that might grant to them rights that are not set
out at the present time. "
In 1965 plaintiff, residing in New York wit.h the ellild,
initiatt·d proceedings pursuant to the URESA provisions of
that state for an order directing defendant to provide "fair
and reasonable" support of the dependent child. She did not
allege any failure by defendant to comply with the divorce
decree, but testified that she now required $750 per month for
the support of the child. The New York court ordered the
petition transmitted to the Superior Court of Los Angeles,
where defendant resides, for proceedings under California's
URESA provisions. That court denied the application for
support "by reason of the lump sum settlement under the
Georgia statute. "
A 1955 Georgia statute provides that a judgment for alimony may not be revised if it awards payment from the
corpus of the husband's estate in lieu of weekly. monthly,
annual or other periodie payments to tIle wife or child. (Ga.
Code Ann. § 30-222; Daniel v. Daniel (1961) 216 Ga. 567 [118
S.E.2d 369].)
.
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At the time the divorce decree incorporating the lump-sum
settlement was rendered, however, the parties' duties were
subject also to Georgia's URESA provisions enacted in 1956,
superseded by substantially similar provisions in 1958. Under
the 1956 statute, a duty to support dependent children is
imposed upon a father "notwithstanding the fact" that he
"has obtained in any Jtate or county a final decree of divorce
or separation from his wife," and he "shall be deemed
legally liable for the support under this Act of any dependent
child of such marriage, whether or not there has been an
award of alimony or support for said child. . . . " (Ga. Laws
1956, URESA § 2(6) (a) ; see Ga. Code Ann. § 99.903 (a) (6)
(a).)

The act further provides that" Duties of support applicable
under this Act are those imposed or imposable under .the laws
of the State where the obligor was present during the period
for which support is sought." (Ga. Laws 1956, URESA § 6;
see Ga. Code Ann. § 99-907 (a.) Thus, if defendant were
present in Georgia during the period for which support is
sought, a Georgia court w()uld deny plaintiff's petition on the
ground that under Georgia law a lump-sum settlement is conclusive upon the parties. 1 Clearly, however, the Georgia
decree does not purport to deprive the courts of the obligor's
residence' of the power to impose a duty of support in
accordance with their law. (See Ehrenzweig, Interstate
Recognition of Support Duties (1954) 42 Cal.L.Rev. 382,
394.)2
1But see Barfield v. Harrison (1960) 101 Ga.App. 497 [114 ·S.E.2d
802], requiring a father residing in Georgia to provide support under
URESA notwithstanding a divorce decree providing for no support, on
the ground that URESA affords all independent remedy. (There is no
indication whether the decree was nonrnodifiable as a lump·sum settlement
under Ga. Code Ann. I 30·222. The result may be explained n the ground
that Georgia law permits a wife to obtain support for the child when the
divorce decree fails to provide for any support. Tlwm/18 v. Thomas
(1959) 215 Ga. 383 [110 S.E.2d 657].)
2It is of no consequence that under URESA Georgia may continue to
measure defendant's obligations within its borders under the decree, notwithstanding a subsequent order of support. (" Any order of support"
under URESA "shall not supersede any previous order of support issued
in a divorce or separate maintenance action, but the amounts for a particular period pursuant to either order 811a11 be credited against amounts
accruing or accrued for the same period under both." Ga. Laws 1956,
URESA § 26; Ga. Code Ann. § 99-927(a).) Under this provision it is
possible that Georgia need not enforce a subsequent URESA order of
another state (see Howard v. Howard (1966) (Miss.) 191 .So.2d 528;
De8pain v. Despain (1956) 78 Idaho ]85 [300 P.2d 500]), nor entertain
an application for support based upon the law of the .father 's residence
elsewhere, but no restraint would thereby be imposed upon the courts
of that residence.
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[la] Whether defendant is subject to a duty of support
imposed apart from, and notwithstanding the lump-sum
settlement must therefore be determined in accordance with
the law of California, his residence during the period for
which such support is sought. Civil Code section 139 provides
that" The provisions of any agreement for child support shall
be deemed to be separate and severable from all other provisions of such agreement relating to property and support of
the wife or husband. . . . All ..• orders for child support,
even when there has been an agreement between the parties on
the subject of child support, may be modified or revoked at
any time at the discretion of the court except as to any
amount that may have accrued prior to the order of modification. . . ." Although this provision was added in 1967 and .
applies prospectively only, it codifies the law existing in
1957-when the parties' agreement was made-insofar as it
permits the upward modification of child support orders. In
1957 Civil Code section 139 provided: "That portion of the
decree or judgment making any such allowance or allowances
[for the support or maintenance of a spouse or child]
may be modified or revoked at any time at the discretion
of .the court. . . ." .[2] Cases construing the effect of the
statute upon integrated property agreements designed, as was
the parties' agreement herein, to settle all rights and duties
as to support as well, make it clear that "No such contract
may, insofar as the children are concerned, abridge the power
of the court . . . to provide for the support of the children."
(Puckett v. Puckett (1943) 21 Cal.2d 833, 839 [136 P.2d 1] j
see also NewhalZ v. Newhall (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 786 [321
P.2d 818].)
Moreover, Civil Code section 138, providing that in divorce
~r separate maintenance actions the court may "make such
order for the custody of such minor children as may seem
necessary or proper and may at any time modify or vacate the
same, " has been construed to govern orders for child support
as well. (Sharpe v. Wesley (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 441 [177
P.2d 802] j Allen v. Allen (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 706 [292
P.2d 581] j see also Worthley v.. Worthley (1955) 44 Ca1.2d
465,470 [283 P.2d 19J j Starr v. Starr (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d
633 [263 P.2d 675] j- Sampsell v. Superior Court (1948) 32
Ca1.2d 763 [197 P.2d 739].) Thus, it has long been the law of
this state that parents cannot abridge the right of their minor
child to proper support by any agreement. (Merritt v. Merritt
(1930) 106 Ca1.App. 234 [289 P. 240]; Rosher v. Superior
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Court (1937) 9 Ca1.2d 556 [71 P.2d 918] .)3 That right has
been enforced undcr uniform reciprocal support legislation
notwithstanding the parents' divorce and any support provisions in the decree. (Wh1"ttlrsey Y. Bellah (1955) 130 Cal.App.
2d 182, 185 [278 P.2d 511] j Smith Y. Smith (1955) 131 Cal.
App.2d 764, 769 [281 P.2d 274] j Smith v. Smith (1954) 125
Cal.App.2d 154, 164 [270 P.2d 613].)
[lb] Defendant contends, however, that under Yarborough v. Yarborough (1933) 290 U.S. 202 [78 L.Ed. 269, 54
S.Ct. 181, 90 A.L.R. 924], California cannot impose; consistent with the full faith and credit clause of the United
States Constitution (art. IV, § 1 j 28 U.S.C. § 1738), any
support obligation in excess of defendant's duty under the
Georgia decree incorporationg the parties' agreement. In Yarborough, a Georgia decree incorporating a lump-sum settlement for child support was final and nonmodifiable in that
state. The child subsequently resided in South Carolina,
where personal jurisdiction was acquired over the father, a
Georgia resident, for the purpose of requiring him to support
the child in accordance with South Carolina law. Over a
vigorous dissent by Justice Stone, the Supreme Court concluded that" the mere fact of [the child's] residence in South
Carolina does not giyc that state thc power to impose such a
duty upon tlie father who is not 11 resident and who long has
beeu domiciled in Georgia. He has fulfilled the duty which he
owes J1(>r by the Jaw of his domicile and the jUdgment of its
court. Upou that judgment 11e is entitled to rely." (Yarb01'ough Y. Yarborough, supm, 290 U.S. at p. 212 [78 L.Ed. at
p. 276].)
'fhe Yarborough case is inapposite here. That decision was
based upon the father's continued domicile and residence in
Georgia. The court expressly reserved the question "whether
South Carolina would have power to require the father, if he
were domiciled there, to make further provision for the
support, maintenance, or education of his daughter." (Ym·.
bora-ugh v. Yarborough, supra, 290 U.S. at p. 213 [78 L.Ed. at
p. 276].) The South Carolina court obtained jurisdiction by
attachment of Yarborough's property, and only later was he
served personally within that state. By contrast, defendant
appears to have made California his home and place of busi·
ness. Although the record does not indicate whether he has
become a domiciliary of this state, clearly his substantial reJa·
3Georgia's contrary local law is apparently unique. (See Ehrcnzweig.
Conflict of Laws (1962) p. 280.)
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tionship with it justifies the application of its law of support.
Moreover, at the time of the Yarborough decision Georgia
had not adopted the URESA provisions. The decree defendant invokes, .however, was subject to that statute, which
expressly reserves to the state of the obligor's residence the
power to apply its law of support notwithstanding the decree.
The decree therefore does not purport to govern defendant's
obligations when he does not reside in Georgia. Thus, to hold
that the decree bars the imposition of support duties in the
circumstances of this case would give it greater credit than it
claims for itself. The Constitution requires no such result.
(Compare Magnolia Petroleum 00. v. Hunt (1943) 320 U.S.
430 [88 L.Ed. 149, 64 S.Ct. 208, 150 A.L.R. 413], with Industrial Oom. v. McOartin (1947) 330 U.S. 622 [91 L.Ed. 1140,
67 8.Ct. 886, 169 A.L.R.1179].)
[3] The purpose of the full faith and credit clause is to
"establish throughout the federal system the salutary principle of the common law that a litigation once pursued to judgment shall be as conclusive of the rights of the parties in
every other court as in that where the judgment was rendered, . . . " (Magnolia Petroleum 00. V. Hunt, supra, 320
U.S. at p. 439 [88 L.Ed. at p. 155].) Thus the Constitution
requires that judgments for alimony to a divorced wife that
cannot be modified under the law of the rendering state,
cannot be modified elsewhere. (Sistare V. Sistare (1910) 218
U.S. 1 [54 L.Ed. 905, 30 S.Ct. 682, 28 L.R.A. N.S. 1068];
Barber v. Barber (1944) 323 U.S. 77 [89 L.Ed. 82, 65 S.Ct.
137, 157 A.L.R. 163].) A divorce decree' incorporating child
support provisions, however, does not terminate the relationship of parent and child as it terminates the relationship of
husband and wife. This case demonstrates why the divorce
state should not be permitted to determine the welfare of the
child for all time and in all states: More than ten years following the divorce, none of the parties appears to have any
connection at all with Georgia; the mother and child reside in
New York, and the fathcr resides in California. 4
Indeed, by the adoption of the reciprocal support legislation in almost all states (see 9C Unif. Laws Ann. 1 (1957»,
the federal system now espouses the principle that no state
may freeze the obligations flowing from the continuing reIa4The Yarborough decision has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Reese
and Johnson, The Scope 01 Full Faith and Credit to Judgments (19(9)
49 Colum.L.Rev. 152, 175; Ehrenzweig, op. cit. 8'Upra, Con1l.ict of Laws
pp. 205, 279·280; Stumberg, Con1lict of Laws (2d ed. 1951) p. 345; Note
(1934) 47 HarvL.Rev. 712.
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tionship of parent and child. (See Howze v. Howze (D.C.
1967) 225 A.2d 477; Allain v. Allain (1960) 24 Ill.App.2d 400
[164 N.E.2d 611] ; Howard v. Howard (1966) (Miss.) 191
So.2d 528; Moore v. Moore (1961) 252 Iowa 454 [107 N.W.2d
97].) The states now share the power over that relationship
to the extent of the obligor's presence in each-a modified
version of the exception suggested by Yarborough in favor of
the power of the obligor's domicile. 5 (See also coneurring
opinion of Justice Rutledge in Halvcy v, Halvey (1947)
330 U.S. 610, 619 [91 L.Ed. 1133, 1138, 67 8.Ct. 903];
dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter in K01Jacs v.
Brewer (1958) 356 U.8. 604, 613 [2 'L.Ed.2d 1008, 1015, 78
S.Ot. 963] ; Reese and Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and
Credit to Judgmc'nts, supra, 49 Colum. L.Rev. 152, 178.) In
deference to the clearly articulated national policy of preserving the flexibility of support obligations, Georgia has
expressly refrained from demanding that its judgment lie conclusive elsewhere. The parties were therefore entitled to. rely
upon that judgment in Georgia alone.
[4] Plaintiff should be allowed to prove that. defendant
has failed to provide fair and reasonable support for his
child. 6 The jUdgment is reversed.
.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
and Sullivan, J., concurred.

liThe "provider's domicile" rule has been criticized as permitting
deserters to flock to no-duty havens. See Ehrenzweig, Interstate Becogflition of Support Duties (1954) 42 Cal.L.Rev. 382, 386. California's
URESA version avoids that possibility by providing that "Duties of
support . . . are those imposed or imposahle under the laws of any state
where the alleged ohligor was present during the period for which support is sought or where the obligee was present when the failure to support commenced, at the election of the obligee." (Code Civ. Proe.,
§ 1670.)
6Defendant contends that plaintiff may not appeal from the order denying relief by reason of article 3-A, section 38 of the New York Uniform
Support of Dependents Law, which provides that" Any respondent in a
proceeding brought under the provisions of this article shall have the
same right of appeal as in civil proceedings or actions brought in the
same court. Any order for support made by ·the court shall not be
affected by an appeal b:lt shall continue in effect until th~ appeal is
decided . • . . " We need riot consider defendant's contention under this
provision, for plaintiff's }"ightto appeal. is g.overned.·iJYGitlifornia law.
California's URESA contains no such provision. -The order 'denying relief
is appealahle as n "final judgmcnt entered in .• '. [a) special" proceedina-" in the superior court. (Code Civ. Proc", § 963, subd. 1.) ..

